Enforce the law: why we need the DMA to be applied without fear or delay

In the late 19th and early 20th century, the United States showed what happens when monopolies go unchecked. As the European Commission wavers in its commitment to anti-trust enforcement, this history has some important lessons for us.

Lessons from the past

Back then, industrial titans—Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, and railroad barons—used their vast market power to crush competitors, extract high prices, and stifle innovation. These so-called “robber barons” didn’t just accumulate wealth; they accumulated power, controlling entire sectors and dictating the terms of economic life.

The public backlash led the USA to pioneer one of the most important policy revolutions in capitalist economies: antitrust. The Sherman Act of 1890 and later the breakup of Standard Oil in 1911 marked the start of a century of increasing enforcement against monopolistic abuse. These actions weren’t ideological—they were pragmatic. Breaking up monopolies unleashed competition, opened space for innovation, and improved economic outcomes.

The rest of the world followed suit. Europe built antitrust into the foundations of the EU with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, and Germany’s competition law, the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB, Law against restrictions on competition), has been in place since 1958. Japan introduced its Antimonopoly Act in 1947, and it remains a core pillar of economic policy. Across democracies, a shared lesson took hold: unchecked monopolies undermine both markets and society.

Cost of failing enforcement

But over the last 40 years, this consensus has crumbled. Since the last big anti-trust action, the breakup of Bell / AT&T in 1983, and especially following the Clinton administration, antitrust enforcement globally dramatically weakened. A narrow focus on consumer prices replaced concern about market power. Mergers were waved through with the promise of «efficiency.» Monopolies were seen as smarter, faster, better—not dangerous.

We now see the cost of that shift.

In sector after sector—tech, agriculture, food, and retail—a small number of players dominate the market. They extract high profits, reduce consumer choice, squeeze suppliers, and suppress innovation. In tech in particular, a handful of dominant platforms use their control to disadvantage competitors, collect surveillance data, and shape markets in ways that serve no one but themselves. Even in cases where their services are «free,» the hidden costs to democracy, privacy, and fair competition are enormous.

Enter the Digital Markets Act

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) was created to address this reality. It recognizes that the digital economy has produced “gatekeepers” with structural power—companies that sit between businesses and users and dictate the terms of the market. These platforms don’t just participate in the economy—they shape it.

The DMA isn’t radical. It’s a return to the common sense of antitrust. It doesn’t break up companies or ban business models. It simply demands fairness: no self-preferencing, no locking in users, no using privileged data from one side of the market to crush competitors on the other. As former EU Commissioner Margrethe Vestager put it: “This is a turning point. Self-regulation is over”.

But enforcement is everything. And already, we see hesitation.

Some argue for delay, or for compromise in the face of political pressure—particularly from the United States, where tech giants are lobbying hard and leveraging trade and geopolitical concerns to water down European action.

This is not just a mistake. It’s a dangerous path.

The cost of cowardice

Failing to enforce the DMA—delaying or diluting it—will do long-term damage to Europe’s economy and political integrity. It will allow gatekeepers to entrench their dominance even further, locking Europe into dependency and depriving its own IT sector of room to grow.

This kind of weakness is not temporary. It’s the beginning of a doom spiral. The weaker our digital sovereignty, the less able we are to push back in the future. The more we give up now, the harder it becomes to reclaim power later. If enforcing our laws is politically difficult today, imagine how much harder it will be when the dominant players are even more entrenched a decade from now.

This is not alarmism. It’s game theory. Bullies escalate when you give in. As we’ve seen in geopolitics and in corporate negotiations alike, compromising with power players—especially those used to getting their way—leads to worse outcomes, not better ones.

Europe has the public’s support

Crucially, European politicians have the public behind them. Recently, a YouGov poll showed that a «Large majority of French, German and Spanish public back tough EU stance on Big Tech, despite risk to Trump relations». Citizens want fairness. They want accountability. And they are tired of corporate misbehavior going unchecked.

We know that lobbyists do their dance behind the scenes. Big tech firms send their executives on media tours across Europe, like the recent media blitz by Microsoft’s vice chair and president sovereign-washing their technology. Unfortunately the European tech sector, and in particular the open source firms, despite building the foundational technology behind even all of Big Tech’s products, are barely active in the lobbying circuit.

A recent investigation by the German news outlet Golem shone light on the huge disparity in lobbying power between Big Tech and open source. The result is that Europe is effectively financing the IT industry in the US to the tune of tens of billions, while those firms turn around and use a good chunk of that money to suppress European innovation, capturing regulators and politicians. Our citizens are aware of all of this – maybe not enough, but the scale of it is hard to hide.

Far from fearing retaliation, politicians should recognize the strength of standing up to tech monopolies. Weakness never won reelection. But leadership and courage often do.

Yes, there may be short-term economic consequences. Perhaps a threatened «pullout» from one service or retaliation on unrelated trade issues. But these are temporary, often exaggerated threats. As we’ve seen in past trade disputes—even with the U.S.—big threats rarely result in meaningful follow-through. And China has shown clearly: standing firm is not only possible, but often more effective than bending the knee.

Stand firm and act strategically

If we need to compromise in negotiations, let it be in short-term financial matters—a tax break, a subsidy, a delay in implementation. But not in enforcement. Not in the structural backbone of the DMA. The real threat to European prosperity is not the anger of Silicon Valley. It’s a future where our digital economy is permanently shaped by foreign monopolies who have no stake in our values, no obligation to our citizens, and no competition to fear.

Antitrust is not a matter of ideology. It’s about the survival of fair markets, innovation, and economic democracy. Europe’s political leaders have every reason—political, strategic, economic, and moral—to hold the line.